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Abstract
Motivated by the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the trade collapse, we analyze the effect of past
banking crises (1976-2002) on trade with a focus on African exporters. We show that they are par-
ticularly vulnerable to a banking crisis in the countries they export to. We distinguish between an
income effect (during a banking crisis, income and exports to the country fall) and a disruption effect
(a banking crisis disrupts the financing of trade channels). For the average country, the disruption
effect is moderate (a deviation from the gravity predicted trade of between 1 to 5%). We find however
that the disruption effect is much larger and long-lasting for African exporters as the fall in trade
(relative to gravity) is 10 to 15 percentage points higher than for other countries in the aftermath of a
banking crisis. This vulnerability of African exports in the short-run does not come from a composition
effect, i.e. from the fact that primary exports are disrupted more severely than manufacturing exports.
Instead, we provide suggestive evidence that the dependence of African countries upon trade finance is
an important determinant of their vulnerability to banking crises in partner countries.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we show that African exports are particularly vulnerable to a banking crisis in the countries
they export to. Our work is motivated by the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Early in the financial crisis, a
common view was that Africa’s low level of financial integration may be a blessing in disguise, insulating
this region from the direct impact of the financial crisis. Indeed, it may be that the direct wealth effect
has been less important than in other regions more open in terms of financial flows. However, based
on past financial crises (1976-2002), we find that African exports are more affected by banking crises in
their trade partners and that the relative under-development of financial systems in sub-saharan African
countries, in particular the strong dependence upon trade finance may make them more vulnerable to the
disruption of trade finance that comes with a banking crisis.
During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, one indication of the vulnerability of African countries on the
trade side was illustrated by their trade flows with the US. Following the crisis, the fall of US imports
from Sub-Saharan African countries has been more dramatic than from the rest of the world. As shown
in Figure 5 in the appendix, from September 2008 and the failure of Lehman, the fall in US imports
from African countries has been much stronger than from other countries. As shown in Figure 6 in the
appendix, both African primary and manufacturing exports were hit harder. This suggests that the fall
in African exports is not only a composition effect due to the importance of primary goods and the fall
in primary goods prices.
To strengthen the motivation of this paper, we can analyze more precisely the way the 2008-2009 crisis
affected African exports by a simple gravity type regression of US bilateral imports using monthly data
from the US International Trade Commission on the period January 2005-August 2009. In this simple
regression, we include dummies for each country, month-of-year dyad µjm (to control for seasonality effects
and for country fixed effects) and time (month) dummies µt. Hence, all determinants of US imports from
a specific country which are constant over time, or specific to a month (in particular during the crisis or
due to changes in commodity prices) are controlled for. We also control for monthly bilateral exchange
rates. We are interested in knowing whether, during the crisis months, US imports from African countries
declined more than imports from other countries, everything else equal. Hence, we include an interaction
term between a binary variable which equals 1 during the period September 2008 to March 20091 (both
months included), and a dummy SSAj that equals 1 when the exporter country is a Sub-Saharan African
(SSA) country. We get the following result (where *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, and
1We have chosen the starting date of the financial crisis in September 2008 because of the Lehman collapse. Whether the
financial crisis (but not the economic crisis) ended in April 2009 is more debatable (see IMF 2009b on this) but our results
are the same if we assume that the financial crisis was still going on until the end of our sample.
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robust standard errors are indicated below the coefficient2):
log(mjt) = −0.336
(0.020)
∗∗∗ log (ERjt)− 1.006
(0.201)
∗∗∗Crisist × SSAj + µjm + µt (1)
where mjt denotes US imports from country j in month t, ERjt is the (average) bilateral exchange
rate between US and country j in month t (an increase means a bilateral depreciation of the dollar).
The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between the crisis months and the African
exporter dummies suggests that African exports to the US have been hit more strongly during the crisis.
Quantitatively, the coefficient on the interaction between Crisist and SSAj implies that, during the crisis,
African exports to the US have decreased around 60% more than exports of other countries (exp(−1.006)−
1).
The recent crisis was not the first event during which trade from SSA countries hit particularly hard.
As shown in Figure 7 in the appendix, a similar pattern was observed during the 1997-98 Asian crisis. In
this figure plot the variations in exports to the five main countries involved in the Asian crisis (Philippines,
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) of SSA countries and of the rest of the world during this event.3
The drop in exports to the crisis countries was dramatically larger and longer-lasting for SSA countries.
The aim of the paper is to show that this is not a specificity of these two events, and to try to investigate
some reasons of this vulnerability of African exports to financial crises in their trade partners.
We see our results as identifying a vulnerability specific to SSA countries a little bit like they are
also vulnerable to political instability and ethnic divisions (see for example Easterly and Levine, 1997).
From this point of view, the fact that growth in SSA countries has rebounded quickly after the financial
crisis is all the more noteworthy. There are several possible reasons for this growth resilience in face of
the trade vulnerability we identify (see IMF, 2009a). First, there was no direct effect of the crisis on the
financial systems in SSA countries. Those were not infected by the products at the core of the crisis in
the US and in Europe. Second, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa placed fiscal and monetary policies
on an expansionary footing in 2009 and 2010. Third, SSA exports have been partly redirected towards
countries (especially in Asia) which have not been at the core of the financial crisis.
Using a large sectoral database of bilateral trade and of banking crises on the period 1976-2002,
and a gravity equation approach, we quantify the deviation of exports from their “natural” level. The
gravity approach which is now very standard in trade and has strong theoretical underpinnings, allows
us to measure the deviation of bilateral exports from the “natural” level of bilateral trade as predicted
2These results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the country level.
3The data comes from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). We keep in the sample only those countries for
which at least 5% of total exports were directed to these countries before the crisis (between 1990 and 1996). This include
the following SSA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, and Zambia. Non SSA countries include Australia, Chile,
China, Ecuador, Hong-Kong, India, Japan, New Zealand, Panama, Singapore, Taiwan, USA, and Yemen.
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by standard determinants such as GDPs or bilateral distance. We distinguish two mechanisms through
which a financial crisis in a country affects the exports of other countries. There is first an income effect as
banking crisis are typically associated with sharp recessions (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 and Claessens,
Kose and Terrones, 2009), which lead to a fall in consumption and imports. Freund (2009) has shown
that the elasticity of trade to income has increased in the past forty years. According to Irwin (2002) this
elasticity was around 2 in the 1960s and 1970s and increased to 3.4 in the 1990s. In this paper, we find
that African exports are more sensitive to large negative income movements in the countries they trade
with. This is true both for manufacturing and primary goods exports.
Second, for a given fall in income and demand, exports may be adversely hit by a banking crisis due
to what we call a disruption effect. The disruption may take direct or more subtle forms. The most
direct effect, one that has been widely discussed in policy circles is the fall in trade finance. There are
however more subtle ways through which the banking crisis may negatively affect trade. In particular,
although it is difficult to measure it, attitudes towards risk may change amongst bankers and traders
during a banking crisis and this may affect more severely countries or groups of countries which are
viewed as more risky. We show that the disruption effect on trade is more important and longer lasting
for African countries than for exporters of other regions. Again, this disruption effect comes in addition
to the fall of exports due to the fall of income and consumption. This sharp difference applies both for
primary products and manufactured goods. In general, this finding does not seem to be driven by any
sector-specific factor. Finally, using proxies for dependence upon trade finance, we provide suggestive
evidence that this dependence may explain part of the fragility of African exports to banking crisis in
trade partners.
The pre-crisis economic literature delivers few insights on the effect of such an event on international
trade. Most studies consider the role of international trade on the probability of occurrence of crises
(Frankel and Cavallo, 2008) or on their transmission (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, Glick and Rose,
1999), showing in particular that trade linkages may explain crises contagion and their regional character.
The few papers looking at the impact of crises on trade generally focus on currency crises (Berman, 2009,
Campa, 2000). Until quite recently, the effect of banking crises had only been studied by Ma and Cheng
(2003), who find a negative impact of such events on imports and a positive impact on exports in the
short-run in the country that experiences the crisis. We go further in this paper by studying the short
and long-run effects of such events but focusing on the effect of exports to countries that are hit by a
financial crisis. By so doing, we attempt to improve the understanding of the precise channels through
which a financial crisis in the rest of the world is transmitted to a country’s trade.
A banking crisis, by tightening financial constraints, may importantly affect the patterns of trade. The
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difference between African and others countries may lie in the type of financing used by exporters. While
firms operating in countries with relatively developed financial markets can use the banking system to
finance trading operations, African exporters rely on others sources, in particular trade credit4 provided
by institutions in the destination country. Trade can be disrupted by a banking crisis that affects banks,
risk perception and trust in both the importing and exporting country. This is the case for letters of
credit. Importers use letters of credit issued by their banks (the issuing bank) as a means of assuring
exporters that they will be paid. If the exporter submits the required documentation (invoices, bills of
lading, etc.) to its bank (the advising or confirming bank), payment is made to the exporter. Letters
of credit require both confidence and liquidity to provide finance and insurance about payment to the
exporter. If confidence or liquidity is missing at any point along the chain from the importer to the
exporter then the mechanism will not function. The importer creditworthiness may be undermined, the
issuing bank may have insufficient funds to extend credit to the importer. The confirming bank may also
lack confidence in the issuing bank. An argument made by Auboin (2009) is also that with Basel II rules,
when market conditions tighten, capital requirements for trade finance instruments tend to increase more
than proportionally to the risk when the counterpart is in a developing country. Inter-firm trade credit may
also be deficient during a financial crisis because of the perceived increase in the risk of non-payment.
Ronci (2004) indeed reports sharp falls of trade finance during the most important emerging markets
financial crises of the 1990s. On the theoretical side, Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010) studies the optimal choice
between different types of trade finance: exporter (open account), importer (cash in advance) finance
and letters of credit. His simulations predict that export volume may drop up to 20% when all firms are
forced to use exporter finance only.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the trade collapse, a burgeoning literature has analyzed the
sources of the trade collapse. Our paper is clearly part of this literature although it focuses on the case of
African countries, and on the more specific issue of the transmission of financial crises to the developing
world. Regarding the recent crisis, the role of financial conditions and of trade finance has in particular
been disputed. On the one hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has pushed the idea that the
trade collapse was partly due to the collapse in trade finance. Auboin, (2009) reports an increase in 2008
in spreads on 90 days letters of credit from 10-16 basis points in normal times to 250-500 basis points for
letters issued by developing countries. The report of the African Development Bank (2009) notes that
“paradoxically, although African commercial banks are ready to provide financing for trade operations,
4As explained very clearly by Amiti and Weinstein (2011), trade credit - contrary to trade finance - has a clear accounting
definition, and refer to the value of transactions between a firm and its buyers/sellers where goods and services are provided
without an advance or immediate payment (see Amiti and Weinstein, 2011, p.1843, footnote 1.). Our data does not allow
us to test for the relevance of specific forms of trade finance - including trade credit - so we will interpret trade finance in a
broad sense in the rest of the paper.
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they are unable to do so because the global credit crisis has caused many international confirming banks
to be forced to temporarily withdraw their credit support from the market. This has led to a growing
gap between supply and demand for trade financing”. Another study by the IMF (2009) that surveyed
several banks in developed and emerging markets reported a sharp increase in the cost of trade finance.
70% of the banks reported that the price for letters of credit had risen.
Recent papers find evidence that the credit conditions observed during the crisis impact export per-
formance. This is the case of Chor and Manova (2012), who use data on the evolution of trade volumes
during the crisis months and find that adverse credit conditions were an important channel through which
the crisis affected trade flows. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), Abiad et al. (2011)5, and Amiti and Wein-
stein (2011) also find evidence on the negative effects of financial crises on trade. The later argue that
exporters typically turn to banks and other financial firms to handle payments because international trade
is typically riskier than domestic trade. Collecting payments in foreign countries is more difficult than
domestically. Also, the added shipping times associated with international trade often mean that interna-
tional transactions take two months longer than domestic transactions. This imposes additional working
capital requirements on exporters. Using Japanese data, they find that of the 10.5% decline in Japanese
exports that occurred following the 1997 banking crisis, the direct effect of declining negotiating bank
health on exports caused about a third of the decline. Bricongne et al. (2012), using French firm level
data, find that firms in sectors structurally more dependent on external finance were the most affected by
the crisis. Our results that countries more dependent on trade finance are also typically more negatively
affected by a financial crisis that takes place in their trade partner, contributes to this literature that
ties export falls during financial crisis to financing conditions. Our results on the importance of trade
finance is also consistent with Ahn, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) who document raises in export prices
relative to domestic manufacturing prices in a number of countries, especially for the goods shipped by
sea. This is however not the view of other papers on this issue. Model-based simulations (Eaton et al.,
2011) suggest that the contagion to countries world-wide came mainly through the contraction of demand
rather than through direct financial channels. Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010), using American data,
find no support for the hypothesis that trade finance played a role in the trade collapse. Alessandria,
Kaboski and Midrigan (2011), show that the calibration of a two-country general equilibrium model with
endogenous inventory holdings generates magnitudes of production, trade, and inventory responses that
are quantitatively similar to those of both past crises and of the 2008-2009 crisis. Finally, Bems, Johnson
and Yi (2010) find that vertical linkages are quantitatively important in understanding the global trade
collapse.
5These authors find that financial crises have a negative and long-lasting effect on imports, but no effect on exports. In
this paper we also find that the impact is larger on the import side.
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Section 2 describes the empirical strategy we choose to quantify the effect of a banking crisis in a
gravity equation. Section 3 presents the data, and section 4 reports our main results on both the income
effect and the disruption effect of past banking crises and the extent to which African countries were hit
differently. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical methodology
Baseline specification. Our main objectives are (i) to use data on past banking crises to analyze
their impact on bilateral trade; (ii) to test whether African exports react differently to crises in partner
countries. The econometric specification we present is based on the gravity equation. Our aim is to
understand how a banking crisis starting in year t in country i (the importer country) affects exports of
country j. We think about a banking crisis in the importer country as potentially affecting several of
the standard determinants of the gravity equation that would typically be generated by a monopolistic
competition trade model:
• the income of the importer country i in year t, Yit: this is the direct income effect. As the banking
crisis hits the income of the importer country, it also leads to lower consumption and therefore lower
imports. One question is whether the income effect is different for African exports. These are issues
which have also partly been addressed by Freund (2009).
• the bilateral trade costs between countries i and j in year t, Tijt: broadly speaking if a finan-
cial/banking crisis hits the importer country this may affect its cost of trading, over and above the
direct effect it has on income. This in particular will be the case if importers or exporters rely
heavily on credit for their trading relation. We call this the trade disruption effect.
• the price index of the importer country i in year t, Pit: if prices fall in the importer country this
has a negative impact on imports of the country.
Our baseline specification takes the form of a gravity equation augmented with crises dummies:
logmijht = α1 log Yit + α2 log Yjt + α3 logPit + α4 logPjt + δXij (2)
+
b∑
k=a
βkBCit−k +
b∑
k=a
γkBCjt−k + νh + ξt + εijht
where mijht are the bilateral exports from j to i in sector h in year t. Pjt is the producer price
of the exporter countries, Pit is the price index of the importer country, and ξt and νh are year and
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industry dummies. Year dummies capture, among others, changes in world commodity prices which are
particularly important for African exports. Note that we will in general estimate this equation using
individual (dyad-sector) fixed effects. Finally, Xij is a vector of time-invariant bilateral determinants of
trade, including distance, common language, common colonizer and contiguity (which will drop out when
including dyad-sector fixed effects).
BCit is a binary variable which equals 1 if a banking crisis started in country i during year t, 0
otherwise. The coefficients βk are the coefficients of main interest in this regression. To look at the
short to medium run impact of crises we will include three lags and a lead of the crises dummies (i.e.
a = −1, b = 3). We will also estimate the persistent or long-run effects of banking crises on the trade
relation by introducing more lags i.e. b = 5. The number of lags is mainly chosen here to keep a maximum
number of crises in the sample, but the inclusion of a different number of lags leaves our main results
qualitatively unchanged.
We will in general carry regressions at the dyad-sector level. We tend to prefer disaggregated data
for several reasons. First because it limits aggregation biases, i.e. the possibility that we identify for
instance an effect for SSA countries which is due to their specialization in some sectors. Second, because
using sector-specific data allows to study the effect of foreign banking crises on SSA countries across
sectors, in particular in primary versus manufacturing goods sectors. Finally, considering disaggregated
data obviously improves the efficiency of the estimations, which is especially important in the presence
of a large number of fixed effects as it is the case here. We will nevertheless check the robustness of our
results using aggregated bilateral trade flows, i.e. dropping the h subscript from equation (2).
Our main question is whether the effect of crises in a partner country differs when the exporter is
a Sub-Saharan African country. To determine this, we add to equation (2) a set of interaction terms
between the importer crises dummies and a dummy which equals 1 if country j (the exporter) is a SSA
country:
logmijht = α1 log Yit + α2 log Yjt + α3 logPit + α4 logPjt + δXij (3)
+
b∑
k=a
βkBCit−k +
b∑
k=a
γkBCjt−k +
b∑
k=a
λkBCit−k × SSAj + νh + ξt + εijht
Here the coefficients λk inform us on the potential additional effect on African exporters of a banking
crisis in the importer country.
Methodological issues. Two main issues, which have been largely discussed in the gravity equation
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literature, arise when estimating this specification. First, the price index of the importer country that
may be hit by a banking crisis is proxied by the producer price index. However, in theoretical models from
which the gravity equation is derived, this price index is the ideal price index which is not observable.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), among others, highlight the biases that can arise when omitting this
term (the “multilateral resistance” indexes) and the various solutions. One solution (see for example
Martin et al., 2008), assuming a CES demand structure, is to eliminate the price index of the importer
country by estimating all imports mijht imports of i from j relative to the imports of country i from a
base country. Since the price index of the importer appears in both the imports from country i and of the
base country and does not depend on the characteristics of the exporter, it cancels out in the ratio
mijht
mibht
where mibht are the imports of country i in year t from the benchmark country.
6 In this case, however,
we cannot estimate the average disruption effect, since the FCit terms cancel each other in the relative
version of (2). However, we can still estimate whether African exports to a country hit by a banking crisis
are affected differently. This specification is then:
log
mijht
mibht
= α5 log
Yjt
Ybt
+ α6 log
Pjt
P
bt
+
b∑
k=a
γkBCit−k × SSAj + ...+ εijht (4)
In the following estimations, we use the USA as the benchmark country. One can argue, however
that this specification relies on a particular CES structure. We will therefore check the robustness of the
disruption effect to the inclusion of a full set of importer×sector×year dummies, therefore estimating:
logmijht = α1 log Yit + α2 logPit +
b∑
k=a
λkBCit−k × SSAj +Djht +Dijk + ...+ εijt (5)
This specification being computationally very demanding, we will keep equation (4) as our base-
line specification. We will however show that the results obtained using specifications (5) and (4) are
quantitatively very similar. We will also check that our results are robust to the additional inclusion of
exporter×sector×year dummies in specification (5). Finally, we will estimate the additional disruption
effect of banking crises in partner countries for SSA countries using aggregated bilateral trade data, also
including importer×year and exporter×year dummies.
A second issue is the treatment of zero trade flows. Taking the log of bilateral trade prevents from
including these observations in the regressions. As zero trade flows account for a significant share of the
6With cross-sectional data, a simpler solution is to introduce exporter and importer fixed effects. However, this does not
solve the omitted variable problem with panel data, as the variations in the price indexes over times are not accounted for.
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potential flows, this can generate a selection bias. Different possibilities exist to account for these zero
trade flows (see Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2007, Felbermayr
and Kohler, 2006, among others). One is to use log(mijht + 1) as a dependent variable. This leads
to inconsistent estimates. Another, more satisfactory, is to use a different estimator which effectively
accounts for the presence of zeros, such as Poisson or Tobit. Following Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
we will check the robustness of our results using a fixed effects Poisson (PPML) estimator. Again, we
will check the robustness of the results to the use of trade flows aggregated at the bilateral level. One
problem is worth mentioning here. As more extensively discussed in Head et al. (2010), zeros in the
trade data can either represent “true” zeros (i.e. no trade actually occurs between the two countries)
or missing values. The common practice in the literature has been to treat all zeros as “true” ones.
This may however generate a bias as a potentially large share of zeros are in fact missing values.7 Each
specification therefore has its limitation. As shown later, our main results are however robust to the use
of these different estimation techniques.
3 Data
Gravity Variables. Our main dataset combines COMTRADE and CEPII data for 27 ISIC 3-digit
industries between 1976 and 2002. To study the effect of banking crises on primary goods sectors as
well, we augmented this database using COMTRADE for different primary good sectors.8 To check the
robustness of the results on aggregate bilateral trade flows, we use data from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS) over the same period.9 The relative prices are captured by the price levels of GDP;
prices and GDP data come from the Penn World Tables. Due to data availability, we cannot use sector-
specific prices. We will show robustness checks which include industry × year dummies to control for
sector-specific price changes.
Crises. We focus on banking crises and the data comes from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Their
data combines various sources. Our final dataset includes around a hundred of events, which include
both, in their classification, severe and systemic banking crises. The definition of a banking crisis is
7Using DOTS data, Head et al. (2010) report a number of examples suggesting that this problem may be important. For
instance, the data contains zero trade flows between Russia, Ukraine and a number of other former USSR countries in the
early nineties. As we use in this paper sectoral bilateral trade data, this issue is a priori even more problematic.
8These sectors are based on SITC classification and contain respectively: raw food and live animals, crude material except
fuels, and raw fuels. We aggregate these sectors into two broad sectors,: raw food and live animals and raw materials. As the
SITC and ISIC classifications partly overlap, we dropped some of the subcategories for each of these sectors. More details
are provided in the appendix.
9Another solution would have been to aggregate the sectoral trade flows from our first dataset, but these aggregated trade
flows would not be necessarily exhaustive. Our results on the vulnerability of SSA countries to foreign income shocks and
banking crises are robust to this aggregation (results available upon request), but we preferred working with exhaustive trade
flows. The correlation between the DOTS data and our aggregated data is 0.96.
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therefore the one adopted and described in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). It is marked by two types of
events (1) “bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more
financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government
assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string
of similar outcomes for other financial institutions” The list of countries included in our data, together
with the years of the crises, is presented in Table 9 in the appendix. This table also contains our proxy
for dependence upon trade finance that we will describe in more details later in the paper.
4 Results
4.1 Average effect of banking crises on trade
We first provide some evidence of the impact of banking crises on trade on the whole sample. To do
so, we estimate equation (2), which coefficients may be biased to some extent if the price indices do not
control for the movement of welfare based ideal price indexes. We check the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of zero trade flows by using alternatively a Poisson PML estimator. We will then turn
to a more detailed investigation of the different transmission channels (income and disruption effects)
and to the specific case of African countries. Table 1 contains the results. Column (1) presents OLS
estimations with dyad-sector fixed effects and year dummies. In columns (2) and (3) we drop the GDP
and prices variables. The change in the crisis coefficients with respect to column (1) therefore provides
information on whether the income or price effects are significant channels through which a crisis affects
trade. Column (4) uses a fixed effects poisson (Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood) estimator. Columns (5) to
(8) replicate columns (1) to (4) using the trade data aggregated at the bilateral level.
Banking crises are found to have a negative yet quantitatively limited impact on imports, which is con-
sistent with Abiad et al. (2011).10 The average yearly deviation in imports in the three years after the
start of the crisis is between -2% and -3%11 when controlling for GDPs and prices (columns (1) and (5)).
Interestingly, this negative effect is found to be significant even controlling for changes in income and
10The positive or insignificant coefficients on the contemporaneous crisis variables might be due to the fact that we are not
capturing the precise time of the year at which the crisis happen. If crises tend to occur on average toward the end of the
calendar year, this coefficient may be capturing increases in trade, for instance to due pre-crisis credit booms. The coefficient
on the exporter crises dummies, not reported, are either slightly positive or insignificant depending on the specification. This
less robust impact is also consistent with Abiad et al. (2011).
11Note that the coefficients on the crisis dummies cannot be directly interpreted as semi-elasticities: the exact percentage
change in exporter following a crisis in t in the importer country is (taking for instance Table 1, column (5)) exp(−0.053)−1 =
−0.051. This makes virtually no difference when the coefficient in low, but the correction becomes more important when the
effect is large.
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prices: when excluding these variables, the effect of the crisis is more negative, up to -5% on average in
the three years that follow the event (columns (3) and (7)). This suggests that the impact of banking
crises on trade also goes through income and prices changes. Finally, accounting for zero trade flows and
using a PPML estimator leads to a similar moderate impact of crises on imports, around -3% to -6%
(columns (4) and (8)).
Table 1: Overall effect of banking crises in partner countries on exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var ln mijht mijht ln mijt mijt
ln GDP exporter 1.279a 0.988a 1.318a 1.032a
(0.025) (0.072) (0.067) (0.124)
ln GDP importer 1.306a 0.864a 1.020a 0.904a
(0.024) (0.058) (0.059) (0.069)
ln price exporter -0.312a -0.403a -0.106b 0.176a 0.116a 0.220a
(0.015) (0.016) (0.050) (0.037) (0.038) (0.068)
ln price importer 0.898a 0.850a 0.567a 0.340a 0.292a 0.478a
(0.014) (0.015) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037) (0.060)
BC importer + 0 years 0.011c 0.017a 0.047a -0.024b 0.016 0.026 0.035b -0.045a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
BC importer + 1 years -0.023a -0.035a -0.048a -0.047a -0.040b -0.040b -0.045a -0.067a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
BC importer + 2 years -0.016a -0.028a -0.048a -0.034a -0.053a -0.061a -0.068a -0.062a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
BC importer + 3 years -0.025a -0.040a -0.056a -0.052a -0.033b -0.039b -0.044a -0.045b
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Average disruption effect[t,t+3] (a) -0.013a -0.021a -0.026a -0.039a -0.027b -0.029b -0.031a -0.055a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Observations 1211897 1211897 1211897 2289789 95241 95241 95241 105600
Estimator OLS PPML OLS PPML
Dyad-sector FE Yes No
Dyadic FE No Yes
Robust s.e. in parentheses, clustered by country-pair-sector (columns (1) to (4)) or country-pair (columns (5) to (8)). A full set of year dummies is included
in all estimations. (a) Average disruption effect for crisis in importer country from t to t+3. Columns (1) to (4) report the results using trade data
disaggregated at the country-pair-sector level. Columns (5) to (8) uses trade data aggregated at the country-pair level. c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations include equivalent banking crises dummies for the exporter country and a lead of the crises dummies.
Figures 1.a and 1.b are based on the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals of a specification
similar to the one presented in Table 1, respectively in columns (1) and (2), but with additional lags and
a lead. It shows the deviation of bilateral imports before and after a crisis that starts in year t = 0. The
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x-axis represents the “natural trade” level as given by the gravity equation, and the figure can therefore
be interpreted as the deviation from this level. The 90% confidence intervals are depicted by dotted lines
around the estimated effect. The other figures in the paper are constructed similarly even though we do
not report all the associated regressions.
The estimated effect in the short-run is close to the one presented in Table 1. We can see in Figure
1.a that the average disruption effect of banking crises on imports is moderate but persistent. When the
GDP variables are not controlled for (Figure 1.b), the effect of banking crises is found not surprisingly to
be much stronger, and much more persistent.
Figure 1: Exports after banking crisis in partner country
(a) Without income effect (b) With income effect
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4.2 The income effect
A first channel through which a banking crisis can hit trade is directly through a fall in demand for all
imports due to a fall of the income of the importers. In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, the effect of a
change of income in country i on its imports is the same for all goods and sectors and the elasticity is one.
However, there might be reasons for which the income elasticity of demand of imports may be different
in different sectors and different countries. Hence, a first question to address is whether Sub-Saharan
African countries are specialized in sectors for which the income elasticity of demand is different from
other countries. More formally, we want to estimate α1, the income elasticity of import demand. Note
that this means that to estimate this elasticity, we cannot use the “relative” gravity equation (4) but (2),
so that the price index potential bias cannot be fully eliminated. In theory, we do not expect African
countries goods to be more income elastic: as discussed by Fieler (2011), with non-homothetic preferences
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low-income economies are generally predicted to specialize in low-quality, less income elastic goods than
advanced economies.12
Table 2: Income effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. var ln mijht mijht ln mijht ln mijt mijt
Sample All Manuf. Primary All
ln GDP exporter 1.226a 1.276a 0.964a 1.365a 0.335a 1.312a 1.000a
(0.025) (0.025) (0.072) (0.027) (0.066) (0.066) (0.126)
ln GDP importer 1.330a 1.299a 0.847a 1.309a 1.121a 1.016a 0.872a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.059) (0.026) (0.067) (0.059) (0.069)
ln price exporter -0.390a -0.320a -0.126a -0.394a 0.155a 0.169a 0.195a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.047) (0.016) (0.041) (0.037) (0.065)
ln price importer 0.907a 0.911a 0.560a 0.970a 0.478a 0.356a 0.467a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.041) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.061)
ln GDP importer× SSA exp. -0.496a
(0.036)
Slowdown (1) -0.024a -0.046a -0.026a -0.024b -0.028a -0.050a
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Slowdown (1)× SSA exp. -0.168a -0.059b -0.171a -0.155a -0.083b -0.098b
(0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.038) (0.033) (0.042)
Estimator OLS PPML OLS OLS PPML
Observations 1211897 1211674 2287710 1059842 151832 95136 105474
Dyad-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Dyad FE No No No No No Yes Yes
S.E. in parentheses, robust and clustered by country-pair-sector (columns (1) to (5)) or country-pair (columns (6) and (7)). c significant at 10%; b significant
at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations include a full set of year dummies. (1): Dummy equal to 1 when ∆GDPit lower than importer-specific first
quartile, zero otherwise.
The results are given in Table 2. Regression (1) shows that the income elasticity for all countries is
in general above unity in our sample. For African countries, this elasticity is lower as shown by the fact
that the interaction between the income of the destination country and a dummy for African Exporters is
significatively negative. One interpretation is that African countries are more specialized in sectors which
respond less to the income level of the importer countries. However, a banking crisis is not a small change
in income and it may be that the effect is not linear. In particular, it may be that the income elasticity of
imports is larger during large recessions than during mild ones. This is what we test in regressions (2) to
(7) where we study whether large variations in GDP have a larger effect on imports and whether African
countries are more vulnerable to this type of negative shock. We construct a dummy variable which we call
12See also Linder (1961).
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“slowdown”, equal to 1 when the variation of GDP between t and t-1 is lower than the first quartile of the
country over the period. In both specifications, bilateral imports are found to respond more negatively to
these slowdowns in partner countries: the coefficient on the slowdown variable is negative and significant
even when controlling for GDP. Moreover, the impact of the slowdown variable is much higher for African
exporters. The additional negative effect is quantitatively important: exp(−0.168)−1 =-15.3% in column
(2), -6% when using a fixed effect Poisson estimator in column (3). Hence, the conclusion is that African
exports, although they do not have a particularly high income elasticity, seem particularly vulnerable
to recessions in the countries to which their export. The interaction between “slowdown” and the SSA
dummy is also significant when replicating the results at the bilateral level (column (6) and (7)).
In regressions (4) and (5), we perform the same regression as in specification (2) but distinguish
between manufacturing and primary sectors.13 African exports are found to react more negatively to
recessions in partner countries in both manufacturing and primary goods sectors. Interestingly, in un-
reported regressions we found that all these results are unchanged if we control for the occurrence of a
banking crisis in the destination country and its interaction with the SSA dummy. This suggests that the
income effect (even in the case of recessions) and the disruption effect are two distinct mechanisms that
negatively affect African exports. We now turn to the study of the disruption effect.
4.3 The disruption effect
Baseline results. We now analyze how African exports react after a banking crisis that takes place in the
partner country, i.e. the country of destination. The results are shown in Table 3. Remember that in these
regressions, we control for the common effect that the change on the income of the importer country has
on all imports, for all determinants of sectoral bilateral sectoral trade which are time invariant (through
the inclusion of country-pair× sector fixed effects) and for yearly changes in trade which are common to
all countries (through the inclusion of year fixed effects), in particular world price movements of primary
goods.
Columns (1) shows the results of estimating equation (3), while columns (2) shows the results using
the “relative” version of the gravity equation (4). In column (3) we include, in addition to the dyad-sector
fixed effect, importer×sector×year fixed effects that aim at controlling in particular for changes in the
importer’s multilateral resistance index. Column (4) presents the most demanding specification, with
sector-dyad, importer×sector×year and exporter×sector×year. In column (5) we include zero trade flows
and check the results of column (1) using a PPML estimator. Finally, in columns (6) to (8) we consider
trade flows aggregated at the bilateral level, either with bilateral fixed effects (column (6)), importer×year
13Primary goods include the following sectors: raw food and live animals, food products, crude material and raw fuels.
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Table 3: Effect of banking crises in partner countries on exports: SSA countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var ln mijht ln mijht/mibht ln mijht mijht ln mijt mijt
ln GDP exporter 1.278a 1.260a 0.988a 1.316a 1.032a
(0.025) (0.024) (0.072) (0.067) (0.124)
ln GDP importer 1.304a 0.864a 1.021a 0.904a
(0.024) (0.058) (0.059) (0.069)
ln price exporter -0.313a -0.361a -0.107b 0.173a 0.221a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.050) (0.037) (0.068)
ln price importer 0.897a 0.567a 0.340a 0.478a
(0.014) (0.042) (0.036) (0.060)
ln relative GDP 1.256a
(0.025)
ln relative prices -0.369a
(0.016)
BC importer + 0 years 0.029a -0.024b 0.033b -0.044a
(0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
BC importer + 1 years -0.010c -0.046a -0.053a -0.066a
(0.006) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
BC importer + 2 years -0.004 -0.033a -0.035b -0.060a
(0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019)
BC importer + 3 years -0.015a -0.050a -0.000 -0.043b
(0.005) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019)
BC importer + 0 years× SSA exp. -0.256a -0.162a -0.193a -0.145a -0.001 -0.090 -0.358a -0.020
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.050) (0.059) (0.077) (0.075)
BC importer + 1 years× SSA exp. -0.179a -0.130a -0.135a -0.064b -0.077c 0.072 -0.154b -0.105c
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.044) (0.055) (0.073) (0.061)
BC importer + 2 years× SSA exp. -0.167a -0.128a -0.121a -0.053b -0.116b -0.098c -0.310a -0.118c
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.050) (0.059) (0.072) (0.061)
BC importer + 3 years× SSA exp. -0.140a -0.116a -0.105a -0.059b -0.148a -0.179a -0.275a -0.128b
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.045) (0.058) (0.071) (0.059)
Average additional disruption effect SSA[t,t+3] (a) -0.185a -0.134a -0.139a -0.080a -0.086b -0.074c -0.274a -0.093c
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.039) (0.042) (0.059) (0.056)
Observations 1211897 1211897 1211897 1211897 2289789 95241 95241 105600
Estimator OLS PPML OLS PPML
Dyad-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Dyadic FE No No No No No Yes No Yes
Importer× sector × year FE No No Yes Yes No No No No
Exporter× sector × year FE No No No Yes No No No No
Importer× year FE No No No No No No Yes No
Exporter× year FE No No No No No No Yes No
A full set of year dummies is included estimations (1) to (5). Robust s.e. in parentheses, robust and clustered by country-pair-sector (columns (1) to (5))
or country-pair (columns (6) to (8)). (a) Average additional disruption effect for crisis in importer country from t to t+3 for SSA exporters. c significant
at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations include equivalent banking crises dummies for the exporter country and a lead of the crises
variables. Estimation (7) contains a vector or bilateral, time-invariant controls (distance, common language, common colonizer, contiguity).
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and exporter×year fixed effects (column (7)) or using a PPML estimator (column (8)).
Whatever the specification, the fall of exports following a crisis in partner country is much higher for
African countries. In columns (1) and (2), the additional drop of African exports in the years following
the start of the crisis is between 13 and 16% (column (1), exp(-0.185)-1). Note that the effect is similar
on average in the standard gravity results (column (1)) and when using the relative version (column (2)),
except that the contemporaneous effect is smaller in the relative version. Including importer×sector×year
fixed effects in column (3) leads to results very similar to column (2) (which we will keep as our baseline
specification), which lends support to the use of this methodology to control for the unobserved mul-
tilateral resistance indexes. Importantly, this additional disruption effect for SSA exporters survives to
the inclusion of the three dimensions of fixed effects in column (4). In this case, the average additional
disruption effect between t and t+3 is around -8%. The effect is quantitatively similar when including the
zero trade flows and using a PPML estimator (column (5)). The average additional disruption effect for
SSA countries during the three years after the event is therefore -8 and -16% depending on the specifica-
tion. Columns (6) to (8) show the results using aggregate trade flows. The additional disruption effect,
although less precisely estimated, is still observed for SSA countries and controlling for importer×year
and exporter×year dummies actually magnifies the size of the effect (column (7)).14
Figure 2: Exports after banking crisis in partner country, SSA vs ROW
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Country-specific effect. We now check that the results are not driven by a specific Sub-Saharan African
country. First, we illustrate our previous results in figure 2, where we run the same regression as in
14In a related work (Berman, de Sousa, Martin and Mayer, 2012) we also find a significantly larger disruption effect for
SSA countries (and quantitatively similar, around -15%) using aggregate bilateral trade data over a much longer time period
(1950-2009).
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column (2), Table 3 but with more lags to study the longer-run effects, and excluding South Africa from
the SSA group. It shows the deviation of African exports before and after a banking crisis that takes
place in year t = 0, with respect to the average disruption effect of other exporters. The x-axis therefore
represents the average disruption effect. The disruption effect is strong: the year the country is hit by a
banking crisis, the additional effect for SSA exports is close to -12%. This specific vulnerability of SSA
exports progressively vanishes but remains significant for at least five years after the start of the event.15
Note again that that this number measures the disruption of trade that comes from the banking crisis
and not the fall of income of the crisis-hit country as this is controlled for through the inclusion of GDPs.
Table 4: Additional disruption effect of banking crises on African trade, by country
(1) (2) (3)
Exporter Average additional disruption effect[t,t+3] s.e.
Equatorial Guinea -0.553a (0.207)
Senegal -0.301a (0.075)
Ghana -0.273a (0.075)
Burkina Faso -0.264a (0.097)
Cote d’Ivoire -0.201a (0.066)
Nigeria -0.190a (0.070)
Madagascar -0.182a (0.080)
Zambia -0.181b (0.078)
Central African Rep. -0.181 (0.127)
South Africa -0.159a (0.041)
Mauritania -0.138 (0.125)
Kenya -0.127b (0.052)
Zimbabwe -0.060 (0.071)
Mali -0.059 (0.093)
Togo 0.015 (0.107)
Cameroon 0.018 (0.072)
Benin 0.034 (0.114)
Ethiopia 0.181 (0.113)
Robust Standard errors, clustered by country-pair-sector, in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. The coefficients
displayed are the average additional disruption effects computed from a specification similar to Table 3, column (2) where the African exporter dummy is
replaced by a country-specific dummy. For each considered country, the other SSA exporters are dropped from the estimation.
We have also checked whether these results were due to some other countries in SSA, or if all SSA
countries were significantly more affected than the rest of the world. In table 4 we present the average
additional disruption effect of African exporters in the year of the crisis and the three following ones.
Among the 18 considered countries, the effect is negative in 14 cases, and negative and significant at the 1
or 5% level in 10 of them. No SSA country is found to react significantly more positively that the average
to banking crises in their partner countries. When significant, the average additional disruption effect
is always at least -10%. This clearly suggests that the vulnerability found before may be due to some
15When including more lags, we find that the additional disruption effect becomes insignificant after 7 years.
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factors that are common to most SSA countries.
Extensive margin. Until now we have considered the effect of banking crises on total trade. It might also
be the case that the probability that two countries trade together after a crisis is significantly lower for
SSA exporters. This is what we test in Table 8 in the appendix, in which we estimate the effect of banking
crises, and of their interactions with the SSA dummy. We use a linear probability model which allows
the inclusion of bilateral fixed effects and eases the interpretation of coefficients. Consistently with our
previous results, the probability that the bilateral trade flow is positive after a banking crisis is generally
significantly lower for SSA exporters, both when using disaggregated (column (1) to (3)) or bilateral trade
data (column (5)).
4.4 Channels of transmission
Composition effect. We now want to better understand the sources of the vulnerability of African exports.
The first possibility is that African countries are specialized in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to
a crisis. In particular, African exports are more concentrated on primary goods and raw materials than
on manufactured goods, and trade in these goods may be more dependent upon the financial system of
the importing country. We run a number of robustness checks. First, to capture movements in sector-
specific prices during crises episodes, we include a full set of year×sector dummies in our estimations.
The results are reported in Table 5, column (1). Our main result remains very similar: the additional
disruption effect for SSA countries is around -13% (exp(-0.141)-1), to be compared with Table 3, column
(2)). Second, we include in our estimations interaction terms between sector dummies and the crises
variables to control for the fact that some sectors (e.g. those more dependent upon external finance)
might be more hit by banking crises. As shown in Table 5, column (2), this leaves the results largely
unchanged. Finally, as shown in columns (3) and (4), this additional disruption effect for SSA countries is
found for both primary products and manufacturing goods, although the effect is less precisely estimated
for primary goods. Hence, composition effects do not seem to be at the source of our results. The exports
of African countries are more affected by a banking crisis in the destination country, and this is true even
after controlling for sector-specific characteristics.
This can be seen clearly in Table 6, which shows the additional disruption effect of SSA countries for
each sector separately (i.e. estimating equation (3) on each sector separately). SSA exports are found to
respond more negatively to crises in partners countries in 26 out of 29 sectors, the effect being significant
at the 1 or 5% level in 15 cases.
Additional robustness. We now perform a number of additional exercises. We first control for an interac-
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Table 5: Effect of banking crises on African trade: more robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ln mijht/mibht ln mijht
Sector All Manuf. Primary All All
ln relative GDP 1.769a 1.256a 1.354a 0.359a 1.207a 1.256a 1.253a
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.071) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
ln relative prices -0.185a -0.370a -0.438a 0.124a -0.438a -0.370a -0.386a
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ln GDP exporter 1.274a
(0.025)
ln GDP importer 1.303a
(0.024)
ln price exporter -0.314a
(0.015)
ln price importer 0.898a
(0.014)
BC importer + 0 years× SSA exp. -0.178a -0.203a -0.166a -0.119 -0.166a -0.198a -0.182a -0.263a
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.076) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
BC importer + 1 years× SSA exp. -0.137a -0.158a -0.153a 0.014 -0.125a -0.152a -0.142a -0.180a
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.078) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
BC importer + 2 years× SSA exp. -0.132a -0.153a -0.120a -0.164b -0.123a -0.152a -0.126a -0.155a
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.073) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
BC importer + 3 years× SSA exp. -0.117a -0.122a -0.100a -0.189a -0.104a -0.123a -0.127a -0.125a
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.071) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Average add. disruption effect[t,t+3](a)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.141a -0.159a -0.135a -0.114b -0.130a -0.156a -0.144a -0.181a
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.054) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Mediterranean and Middle East -0.072a
(0.023)
Asia 0.044a
(0.011)
Central and Latin America -0.009
(0.013)
Observations 1211897 1211897 1059947 151950 1211897 1211897 1211897 1211897
Sector×year dummies Yes No No No No No No No
Sector×crises dummies No Yes No No No No No No
Interaction SSA exp.× ln GDP imp. No No No No Yes No No No
Interactions Banking crises× ln GDP exporter No No No No No Yes No No
Interactions Currency crises× SSA exp. No No No No No No Yes No
Robust Standard errors, clustered by country-pair-sector, in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations
include dyad-sector fixed effects and year dummies. (a) Average additional disruption for a group of countries after a crisis in importer country, from t to
t+3. All estimations include equivalent banking crises dummies for the exporter country and a lead of the crises variables. Estimation (5) include importer
banking crises dummies and their interaction with dummies for each zone except industrialized countries, taken as the benchmark.
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Table 6: Effect additional disruption of banking crises on African trade, by sector
(1) (2) (3)
Sector Average additional disruption effect[t, t+ 3], SSA s.e
Plastic products -0.385a (0.098)
Wearing apparel, exc. footwear -0.321a (0.099)
Electrical machinery -0.293a (0.066)
Pottery china earthenware -0.290a (0.095)
Paper and products -0.286b (0.106)
Prof. and sci. equipment -0.258a (0.081)
Food products -0.250a (0.079)
Leather products -0.243a (0.097)
Other chemicals -0.223a (0.080)
Printing and publishing -0.209a (0.092)
Rubber products -0.209b (0.104)
Glass and products -0.176 (0.108)
Non-ferrous metal -0.170 (0.118)
Fabricated metal products, exc. mach. and equip. -0.164b (0.075)
Textiles -0.163b (0.072)
Machinery except electrical -0.158b (0.066)
Wood products except furniture -0.153b (0.077)
Raw food and live animals -0.138 (0.091)
Transport equipment -0.134 (0.104)
Other manuf. -0.134 (0.082)
Other non-metal min. prod. -0.110 (0.107)
Industrial chemicals -0.102 (0.083)
Footwear -0.096 (0.165)
Beverages -0.047 (0.157)
Petroleum refineries -0.045 (0.151)
Raw materials (incl. fuels) -0.033 (0.093)
Furniture except metal 0.023 (0.108)
Iron and steel 0.016 (0.121)
Tobacco manufactures 0.380b (0.173)
Robust Standard errors, clustered by country-pair-sector, in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. The coefficients
displayed are the average additional disruption effects computed from a specification similar to Table 3, column (1), run separately for each sector in the
sample.
tion term between the SSA dummy and the GDP of the importer in Table 5, column (5). This leaves the
results unchanged (to be compared with Table 3, column (2)), suggesting that indeed the disruption and
income effects are two distinct channels through which SSA exporters are more affected by banking crises
in destinations countries. Second, we test whether this vulnerability is explained by the income level of
SSA countries, by including a set of interaction terms between the crisis dummies and the (average) log
of GDP of the exporter country.16 As shown in column (6) of Table 5, the results are again very similar.
In column (7), we include interaction terms between the SSA dummies and currency crises dummies,
to check that the SSA vulnerability is indeed related to banking crises and not to the large currency
devaluations that often occur simultaneously.17
16Similar results are found when using contemporaneous GDP or GDP per capita.
17The currency crises dates have been computed from IFS data using the methodology described in Eichengreen and Bordo
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Finally, In column (8) of Table 5 we show that, despite the fact that the response of a country’s export
to banking crises in destination countries is heterogeneous across regions, SSA countries are clearly the
most affected group. Taking industrialized countries as a benchmark, we find that Mediterranean and
Middle East countries are also found to react more negatively, although this additional disruption effect
is quantitatively much smaller (-7%) than the one we find for SSA countries. Asian countries are found
to respond slightly more positively than industrialized countries.
To summarize, our results suggest that the vulnerability of SSA exporters is not due to sector-specific
composition effects, to the income level of SSA countries, or to the income or exchange rate effects which
often go together with banking crises.
Trade finance. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main reasons that might explain the drop
in exports of African countries when their trading partners are facing a banking crisis is related to the
disruption of trade finance. If the low level of development of their financial system forces African
firms to rely more heavily on trade finance from the importing country, and if this type of financing is
particularly hit by banking crises (Ronci, 2004), exports of African countries may be hit harder whatever
the sector considered. As a proxy for trade finance dependence, we follow Ronci (2004) and use the
level of outstanding short-term credit in U.S. dollars as reported in the Global Development Finance
(GDF), which is derived from Balance of Payment information and includes short-term credit for trade
in dollars as reported by the OECD and the international banks’ short-term claims as reported by the
BIS. As already pointed out by Ronci (2004), this variable has several limitations, in particular because
it excludes trade financing associated with intra-firm trade by multinational corporations or trade related
to foreign direct investment. On the other hand, it has a good coverage for developing countries, and is
available over the entire period.
For each country, we construct several measures: (i) a time-varying measure representing the average
ratio of trade finance over total credit, computed by decade and country; (ii) the average ratio of trade
finance over total credit over the entire period; (iii) a dummy which equals 1 if the average ratio computed
by exporter is above the median of the sample. As shown in Table 9, African countries clearly display a
higher level of dependence upon trade finance on average: the median (mean) of the ratio is 0.21 (0.25) for
African countries, and only 0.08 (0.10) for the rest of the sample. This dependence of African countries
on trade finance was also noted by Jinjarak (2007).
Can it partly explain the vulnerability of African trade to crises in partner countries? To answer this
question, we include in our regressions interaction terms between the trade finance dependence proxies and
banking crisis in the importer country. The results are reported in Table 7, columns (1) to (8). Columns
(2002).
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Table 7: Effect of banking crises on African trade: the role of trade finance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: ln mijht/mibht
ln relative GDP 1.527a 1.526a 1.525a 1.688a 1.685a 1.688a 1.685a 1.313a
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.032)
ln relative prices 0.024 0.022 0.022 -0.041c -0.042c -0.041c -0.042c -0.372a
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017)
BC importer + 0 years× SSA exp. -0.119a -0.081b -0.136a -0.107b -0.136a -0.085b -0.193a
(0.036) (0.041) (0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.040) (0.028)
BC importer + 1 years× SSA exp. -0.082b -0.031 -0.113a -0.049 -0.113a -0.051 -0.146a
(0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.039) (0.027)
BC importer + 2 years× SSA exp. -0.106a -0.054 -0.131a -0.043 -0.131a -0.059 -0.154a
(0.037) (0.042) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.041) (0.028)
BC importer + 3 years× SSA exp. -0.102a -0.051 -0.129a -0.033 -0.129a -0.081b -0.133a
(0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.027)
BC imp. + 0 years × trade fin. (a) -0.263a -0.176c -0.147 -0.076a
(0.077) (0.090) (0.129) (0.028)
BC imp. + 1 years × trade fin. (a) -0.270a -0.240a -0.335b -0.093a
(0.079) (0.090) (0.135) (0.027)
BC imp. + 2 years × trade fin. (a) -0.307a -0.252a -0.469a -0.108a
(0.076) (0.088) (0.136) (0.027)
BC imp. + 3 years × trade fin. (a) -0.293a -0.243a -0.501a -0.073a
(0.071) (0.082) (0.118) (0.026)
BC imp. + 0 years× fin. dev. exp. 0.010
(0.017)
BC imp. + 1 years× fin. dev. exp. 0.019
(0.017)
BC imp. + 2 years× fin. dev. exp. -0.022
(0.017)
BC imp. + 3 years× fin. dev. exp. -0.042a
(0.016)
Average add. disruption effect SSA[t,t+3] -0.102a -0.054c -0.127a -0.058c -0.127a -0.069b -0.156a
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020)
Observations 435680 435680 435680 467960 467960 467960 467960 1151129
Interactions Banking crises× ln GDP per cap. exporter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Standard errors, clustered by country-pair-sector, in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations
include dyad-sector fixed effects and year dummies. (a) Short term credit over total private credit (Global Development Finance database), computed by
decade in columns (2) and (3), as an average over the entire period in columns (5), and as a dummy taking the value 1 for exporters above the sample
median in column (7). All estimations include equivalent banking crises dummies for the exporter country and a lead of the crises variables. Financial
development denotes the ratio of private credit over GDP.
(1), (4) and (6) replicate our baseline regression on the subsample of countries for which the trade finance
proxies are available: again, African countries are found to react significantly more negatively than other
countries to a crisis in the destination country. Note that the additional disruption effect here is slightly
lower than in our benchmark estimations because we exclude developed countries, for which the trade
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finance proxies are not available, but that react more positively to crises than the average country. We
include in these estimations interaction terms between the (average) log of GDP per capita of the exporter
country and banking crises in the importer country to ensure that we are capturing the effect of trade
finance and not economic development in general. Clearly, the level of development of SSA countries is
not found to explain their vulnerability to foreign banking crises, as the average additional disruption
effects remains negative and highly significant in these estimations.18
Figure 3: Exports after banking crises in partner country, SSA exporters vs ROW, controlling for trade
finance
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On the other hand, the interactions between trade finance dependence and the crisis dummies are
negative and strongly significant, regardless of whether we use the measure computed by decade (columns
(2) and (3)), over the entire period (column (5)) or the dummy (column (7)). More importantly, the
vulnerability of SSA countries is divided by at least two when including these interactions: the average
additional disruption effect of these countries falls from 10-13% to 5-6%. Note again that we control for
interactions between GDP per capita and importer crises dummies, so that it is therefore unlikely that
we are capturing the effect of overall economic rather that dependence upon trade finance.
In general, these results suggest that trade finance dependence may explain part of the vulnerability
emphasized before. When including the trade finance interactions, the additional disruption effect of SSA
countries remains significant (but quantitatively small) only during the year. This can be seen clearly
in Figure 3 which represents the longer-run disruption effect for African countries, controlling for trade
18Not reported, the coefficients on the interaction terms between GDP per capita of the exporter and banking crises in
the importing country are positive and significant, suggesting that rich countries react more positively to crises in their
destination countries.
23
Figure 4: Exports after banking crises in partner country, high trade finance
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finance dependence: no additional effect for African countries remains in this case. Of course, these results
should be interpreted with caution, as our proxy for trade finance is imperfect. They however suggest
that this particular type of financing may play an important role to explain the vulnerability of certain
countries to financial crises in their trade partners.
More generally, we can analyze the role of trade finance dependence not specifically in the case of
African countries. Again, we interact our banking crises variables with a dummy variable which equals 1
if the exporter country is above the median of the sample in terms of our trade finance dependence proxy,
as in Table 7, column (7), but excluding the interaction between crises and the SSA dummy. Figure 4
represents the additional disruption effect for these exporters: they react more negatively in the short-run
and for these countries, exports remain below their natural level during at least 5 years after a banking
crisis hits their trading partners. Note that Figure 4 looks very similar to Figure 2, further supporting
the trade finance explanation.
Finally, in column (8) we have interacted our crisis dummy with the exporter’s level of financial
development (defined as the average ratio of private credit over GDP over the period). The interaction
term is positive and significant (except in the third year), suggesting that more financial developed
economies react less negatively to financial crises in their partner countries. However, in this case the
additional effect on African exports remains significant and of similar size.
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5 Conclusion
Macroeconomic volatility is typically higher in African countries. This is in particular due to large
external shocks such as terms of trade shocks. In this paper we have documented another potential
source of macroeconomic volatility that comes from financial shocks affecting trade partners. We have
shown that African countries are more vulnerable to financial crises that affect these trade partners. We
found that in the past banking crises, African exports have been hit harder and longer by recessions and
banking crises in countries they export to. This is not only due to the composition of African exports
and the concentration on primary goods. We have also found that the higher dependence of African
exports on trade finance may explain this particular fragility of African exporters to a banking crisis in
importer countries. One interpretation is that during a banking crisis when uncertainty is high, trust
and liquidity are low, banks and firms in the importer country first cut exposure and credit to particular
countries which are seen as more risky. This would in particular affect trade finance through letters
of credit where the importer pays the exporting firm in advance. It is also likely that during banking
crisis, financial institutions “renationalize” their operations and reduce their exposure to foreign banks
and firms. Exporters in countries with a strong financial system may be able to better resist to such
retrenchment of foreign banks. Clearly, for African firms which are more dependent on foreign finance,
this option may not be feasible. At this stage, these interpretations of our results are only tentative.
However, our results point to the role that some forms of financial development may play in helping to
cope with external shocks such as financial crises in partner countries.
In general, our results suggest that financial crises in foreign countries might affect Sub-Saharan
African economies importantly through their effect on trade. In a recent work, Berman and Couttenier
(2012) find, using data on civil conflict locations within a set of SSA countries, that the country’s exposure
to financial crises in the rest of the world increases the likelihood of conflict within the country, especially
in the most opened regions. These external (financial) shocks might therefore have important effects on
economic and political instability within Sub-Saharan African countries through international trade.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Primary goods
We add to the CEPII data information on primary goods bilateral trade from COMTRADE. We consider
the following SITC sectors: raw food and live animals (0), crude material, inedible, except fuels (2),
mineral fuels lubricants and related materials (3). We do not consider sector 2 as it is already included
in the CEPII data. For each of these sectors, we drop some subcategories which are already included in
the CEPII data (and therefore do not represent primary goods). To do so we use a concordance Table
from Maskus (1989) available on Jon Haveman’s website19. This leads us to drop the following SITC
categories: 035, 037, 046, 047, 048, 059, 073, 081; 223, 232, 244, 248, 251, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269; 322,
325, 334, 335, 342, 344, 345. Finally, we aggregate categories 2 and 3 to consider raw materials as a whole.
6.2 Additional figures
Figure 5: African exports during the 2008-2009 crisis
Exports to US: January 08 to December 2010
(Source: USITC)
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Figure 6: African exports during the 2008-2009 crisis, by commodity
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Figure 7: Exports to Asian crisis countries
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6.3 Additional Tables
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Table 8: Effect of banking crises in partner countries on export probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var Pr(mijht > 0) Pr(mijt > 0)
ln GDP exporter 0.093a 0.087a -0.025b
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
ln GDP importer -0.070a 0.040a
(0.003) (0.011)
ln price exporter -0.017a -0.028a -0.061a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
ln price importer -0.028a -0.027a
(0.002) (0.006)
BC importer + 0 years 0.019a -0.005
(0.001) (0.003)
BC importer + 1 years -0.004a -0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
BC importer + 2 years 0.007a 0.002
(0.001) (0.003)
BC importer + 3 years 0.009a -0.004
(0.001) (0.003)
BC importer + 0 years× SSA exp. -0.022a -0.021a -0.018a -0.007 -0.058a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011)
BC importer + 1 years× SSA exp. -0.012a -0.016a -0.010a -0.018c -0.074a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
BC importer + 2 years× SSA exp. -0.037a -0.031a -0.027a -0.008 -0.067a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011)
BC importer + 3 years× SSA exp. -0.028a -0.026a -0.019a -0.006 -0.064a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011)
Average add. disruption effect SSA[t,t+3] (a) -0.025a -0.023a -0.019a -0.010 -0.066a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 2313210 2347856 2313210 108237 108237
Estimator LPM LPM
Dyad-sector FE Yes No
Dyadic FE No Yes No
Importer× sector × year FE No Yes Yes No No
Exporter× sector × year FE No Yes Yes No No
Importer× year FE No No No No Yes
Exporter× year FE No No No No Yes
Robust s.e. in parentheses, clustered by country-pair-sector (columns (1) to (4)) or country-pair (columns ((5) to (8)). A full set of year dummies is
included in all estimations. (a) Average additional disruption effect for crisis in importer country from t to t+3 for SSA exporters. Columns (1) to (3)
report the results using trade data disaggregated at the country-pair-sector level. Columns (4) and (5) use trade data aggregated at the country-pair level.
All estimations include equivalent banking crises dummies for the exporter country and a lead of the crises variables. Estimation (4) contains a vector or
bilateral, time-invariant controls (distance, common language, common colonizer, contiguity). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Crises and trade finance data
Country Crisis Trade finance Country Crisis Trade finance
Algeria 1990 0.11 Korea 1983, 1986, 1997 -
Argentina 1980, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001 0.14 Madagascar 1988 0.29
Australia 1989 - Mauritania 1984 0.25
Austria - - Mexico 1981, 1982, 1992, 1994 0.15
Bangladesh 1987 0.03 Mali 1987 0.24
Belgium - - Morocco 1983 0.08
Benin 1988 0.23 Malaysia 1985, 1997 0.03
Burkina Faso 1988 0.15 Nepal 1988 0.07
Bolivia 1987, 1994, 1999 0.08 Netherlands - -
Brazil 1985, 1990, 1995 0.05 Nigeria 1992, 1997 0.24
Central Afr. Rep. 1976, 1988 0.44 Norway 1987 -
Canada 1983 - New Zealand 1987 -
Chile 1976, 1980 0.05 Panama 1988 0.08
China 1997 - Peru 1983, 1999 0.18
Cote d’Ivoire 1988 0.18 Philippines 1981, 1997 0.06
Cameroon 1987, 1995 0.18 Portugal - -
Colombia 1982, 1998 0.06 Paraguay 1995, 2002 0.08
Costa Rica 1987, 1994 0.16 Senegal 1988 0.16
Denmark 1987 - Singapore 1982 -
Ecuador 1981, 1994, 1996, 1998 0.12 Spain 1977 -
Eq. Guinea 1983 - South Africa 1977, 1989 -
Egypt 1980, 1990 0.05 Sri Lanka 1989 -
El Salvador 1989, 1998 - Sweden 1991 -
Ethiopia 1994 0.16 Switzerland - -
Finland 1991 - Togo 1993 0.21
France 1994 - Thailand 1979, 1983, 1996 0.02
Ghana 1982, 1997 0.44 Tunisia 1991 0.04
Greece 1991 - Turkey 1982, 1991, 1994, 2000 0.19
Indonesia 1992, 1997 0.05 Taiwan 1983, 1995, 1997 -
India 1993 0.03 Uruguay 1981, 2002 0.08
Italy 1990 - UK 1984, 1991, 1995 -
Iceland 1985, 1993 - USA 1984 -
Hong Kong 1982, 1983, 1998 - Venezuela 1978, 1993 0.12
Japan 1992 - Yemen 1996 0.66
Jamaica 1994 0.21 Zambia 1995 0.85
Lebanon 1988 - Zimbabwe 1995 0.06
Kenya 1985, 1992 -
Trade finance represents the average ratio of short term over total credit as presented in the main text. Crisis is the beginning year of the banking crisis as
in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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